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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/07/2011

Accident number: 733

Accident time: 08:55

Accident Date: 15/03/2010

Where it occurred: AF/0105/01625, MF
0268, Ashraf Khail
Village, Qara Bagh
District, Kabul
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 03/05/2010

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
steep slope
Date last modified: 11/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recored

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-04 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Kabul to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the de-miner of [Demining group] DT-04. A separate investigation team
was also assigned by MCPA for internal investigation. The accident occurred at 08:55 hours,
15 March 2010 in Task # AF/0105/01625/MF 0268, located in Ashraf Khail village, Qara Bagh
district of Kabul province.
SUMMARY:
MF # 0268 was contaminated with anti-personnel mines laid by Russian troops in 1984 in
order to create a security built around their military position for the protection of Bagram Air
Base. For the second time, during the armed conflicts between Taliban and Northern Alliance
in 1997-2000, this area was re-contaminated.
[Demining group] DT-04 started clearance operation on mentioned task on 3rd Feb 2010,
they cleared 16250 sqm out of 34370 sqm area, they have found/destroyed 20 anti-personnel
(PMN and PMN2) mines before accident happening.
On 15 March 2010 at 08:55 hrs while [the Victim] was busy in excavation of a detected signal,
suddenly the accident happened. As a result the deminer got severe injuries on his face, eyes
and his right hand.
According to the investigation report the terrain of the ground where the accident happened
was steep sloping. Therefore, the deminer created staircases there to get himself stable for
further working. He started excavation on the top of the sloping area; the position of mine
might had been changed due to seasonal floods, so the excavation tool touched the pressure
plate of the mine and caused it to go off. From the injuries to the face and eyes of the
deminer, it seems that the deminer has not used his visor properly. The area was bushy and
required MDU support which had been identified in site clearance plan, but it was not
provided to the team on timely manner.
CONCLUSIONS:
Poor supervision by the command group is a contributing factor to this accident. As in a
proved high threat area, the deminer was working carelessly without being controlled by his
section leader. Being late in providing MDU support to the team was another contributing
factor to this accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
•

It is the responsibilities of respective IP’s operations department to make sure that a
proper system of command and control exists in the field.

•

Inappropriate use of visor resulted in injuries to the eyes and face of the deminer;
therefore, it is highly recommended that the command and control element should be
more supported by operations department.

•

The operations department should strongly follow the site operations plan and
provide any support required for the clearance operations on timely manner.
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Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by MCPA is required to be
submitted to the MACCA Operations department by no later than 7 days, effective to the
issue date of this letter.

Victim Report
Victim number: 926

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Not recorded

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Eyes; severe Face; severe Hand
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that there was no “proper system of command and control” in the field and
the Victim was working with his visor raised and this error was not corrected. The secondary
cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators found that the
demining group’s Operations department had failed in its responsibilities.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible than the
internationals with overall responsibility.
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